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I. INTRODUCTION
It has become lamentably common for courts to issue preliminary
injunctions in copyright cases once rights holders have shown a
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits without going on to
require them to prove that they will suffer irreparable harm unless the
injunction is issued.' Harm is too often presumed to be irreparable if
plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case of infringement.2 This
presumption cannot be squared with traditional principles of equity,
as interpreted in numerous Supreme Court decisions.
* Richard M. Sherman Distinguished Professor of Law and Information, University of
California, Berkeley. I wish to thank Peter Shane and Edward Lee for the invitation to
contribute to this symposium volume and colleagues at Berkeley Law School and the
Electronic Frontier Foundation for insightful comments on earlier drafts. I am also grateful
to Douglas Laycock for his insightful comments about traditional principles of equity as
applied to the issuance of injunctions.
* Berkeley Law School, J.D. expected 2011.
'See, e.g., PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 13.1.2(b) at 13:17 (3d Ed. 2005)
(citing cases); 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.o6
[A][2][b] (2009); WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 22:44 (2009) (characterizing
the presumption of irreparable harm as "lamentable" and noting that it has been applied in
all but the 58 Circuit).
2 See, e.g., Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1335 (9th Cir.
1995)(presuming irreparable harm upon a showing of likelihood of success on the merits);
Video Trip Corp. v. Lightning video, Inc., 866 F.2d 50, 51-52 (2d Cir. 1989)(same).
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The presumption of irreparable harm is particularly troublesome
and inappropriate in cases involving transformative uses of existing
works, such as remixes and mashups of movies and music on user-
generated content sites like YouTube, because free expression and free
speech interests of creative users are at stake and transformative use
cases are often close.3 Indeed, if any presumption about harm is
appropriate in transformative use cases, it should probably run in
favor of irreparability of harm to the defendants' free expression and
speech interests under First Amendment case law which treats
preliminary injunctions as presumptively unconstitutional prior
restraints on speech.4
Part II of this Article discusses traditional principles of equity
under which the Supreme Court has opined that the burden of proof
of irreparable injury should rest squarely on the shoulders of plaintiffs
who seek the extraordinary remedy of preliminary injunctive relief
Especially relevant is the Supreme Court's 2006 decision in eBay, Inc.
v. MercExchange, LLC,5 which rejected the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit's categorical rule in favor of issuance of injunctions in
patent cases.6 We regard the presumption of irreparable harm in
copyright cases to be inconsistent with the holding and logic of eBay,
as some trial courts, but unfortunately not all, have recognized in the
post-eBay case law.
3 See, e.g., Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 2oo8 U. ILL. L. REV.
1459 (giving examples of remixes and mashups); CENTER FOR SOCIAL MEDIA, CODE OF BEST
PRACTICES ON FAIR USE FOR ONLINE VIDEO, June 2008, available at
http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/resources/fair-use/C23/ (recognizing free
expression interests of creative reusers of video content); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG,
REMIx: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY (20o8) and sources
cited in Part III.
4 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DuKE L.J. 147 (1998); Brief for Amicus Curiae The New
York Times, et al., to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Salinger v. Colting, Case No.
09-2878-cv (2009)("NY Times Brief'). See also Pamela Samuelson, Principles for
Resolving Conflicts Between Trade Secrets and the First Amendment, 58 HASTINGS L.J.
777, 811-33 (2007) (discussing the application of the prior restraints doctrine in trade
secrecy cases raising First Amendment defenses).
5 547 U.S. 388 (20o6).
6 See, e.g., MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(applying its "general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent
infringement absent exceptional circumstances"), rev'd, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC,
547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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While we think that eBay and other Supreme Court decisions
make this presumption inappropriate in all preliminary injunction
copyright cases, Part III explains why presuming irreparable harm is
especially problematic when the challenged work is transformative
and when the defendant raises a plausible arguments that the use was
fair, that only ideas were appropriated, or that similarities in
expression were not substantial enough to infringe. Presuming
irreparable harm in transformative use cases is, moreover,
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's rejection of any presumption of
harm in transformative fair use cases in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music
Corp.7 Such a presumption strips defendants of procedural safeguards
precisely when these protections are most needed to give effect to the
First Amendment interests of follow-on creators and the
constitutional goals of copyright in fostering the ongoing progress of
the creation and dissemination of original works of authorship.
II. TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY REQUIRE PLAINTIFFS TO PROVE
IRREPARABLE HARM TO QUALIFY FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.
In eBay, the Supreme Court asserted that under long-standing and
well-established principles of equity, plaintiffs must demonstrate four
things to qualify for injunctive relief: (1) harm to the plaintiff will be
irreparable unless an injunction issues; (2) remedies available at law
are inadequate to compensate for the injury; (3) a balance of
hardships among the litigants favors the plaintiff; and (4) the
injunction would not bring about a disservice to the public interest.8
At the preliminary injunction stage, plaintiffs must also prove that
they are likely to succeed on the merits.9
7 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
8 eBay, 547 U.S. at 391. According to Douglas Laycock, a prominent remedies scholar, the
four-part test the Court announced in eBay for judging whether to issue permanent
injunctions "never existed before; it was made up out of whole cloth, and is incoherent."
See Letter from Douglas Laycock, Yale Kamisar Collegiate Professor of Law at University of
Michigan Law School, to Pamela Samuelson and Kryzstof Bebenek (Nov. 13, 2009)
("Laycock Letter") (on file with the authors). See also Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge's
Equitable Discretion Following eBay v. MercExchange, 27 REV. LITIG. 63, 76 n. 71 (2007)
("Remedies specialists had never heard of the four-point test.") Another influential article
on standards for issuance of injunctive relief is John Leubsdorf, The Standard for
Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REv. 525 (1978), which is discussed infra notes 133-
36 and accompanying text. Congress may, however, specifically direct that injunctions
should issue without full consideration of the usual equitable factors. See, e.g., CBS
Broadcasting, Inc. v. EchoStar Communications Corp., 450 F.3d 505, 527 (11th Cir. 2006).
9 See, e.g., Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546, nl.12 (1987).
2010) 69
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
A. EBA Y REQUIRES COURTS TO APPLY EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES IN
PATENT AND COPYRIGHT CASES
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in eBay, the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit did not accept that equitable
considerations should limit the issuance of injunctions in patent cases.
The Federal Circuit reasoned that the very nature of patents, which
grant their owners rights to exclude unlicensed firms from making,
selling or using their inventions during the life of the patent, justified
a general rule that injunctions should issue upon a finding of patent
infringement.o This court relied on similar reasoning to justify a
presumption of irreparable injury when patent plaintiffs established a
likelihood of success on the merits when seeking preliminary
injunctions."
In its unanimous decision in eBay, the Supreme Court rejected the
Federal Circuit's automatic injunction rule and reversed the Federal
Circuit's ruling that MercExchange was entitled to an injunction
against eBay's continued use of its patented method of facilitating
electronic markets for sales of goods through establishing a central
authority to promote trust among participants.12 The Court directly
challenged the Federal Circuit's nature-of-the-patent-grant rationale
for its categorical rule in favor of injunctive relief upon a finding of
infringement.'3
The creation of a property right in a patented invention, the Court
pointed out, "is distinct from the provision of remedies for violation of
that right."'4 The Federal Circuit's categorical rule ignored key
provisions of the patent statute. The same provision that states that
"patents shall have the attributes of personal property" also makes
10 MercExchange, 401 F.3d at 1338. See also Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., Ltd., 868
F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989) ("It is the general rule that an injunction will issue when
infringement has been adjudged, absent a sound reason for denying it."); W.L. Gore &
Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("This court has
indicated that an injunction should issue once infringement has been established unless
there is a sufficient reason for denying it.").
See, e.g., Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
12 eBay, 547 U.S. at 391-92.
'3 Id. at 392.
14 Id.
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clear that these rights are "[s]ubject to the provisions of this title."'5
The injunctive relief provision states plainly that injunctions "may"
issue when patent infringement has been found, not that injunctions
must issue.16 Indeed, this same provision specifically states that
injunctions should issue "in accordance with principles of equity."'7
The Federal Circuit's categorical rule in favor of injunctions was
thus out of sync with the patent statute, as well as with the Court's
precedents in copyright cases. Like the patent statute, the copyright
law provides creators with a right to exclude unlicensed parties from
certain exploitations of their works;'8 yet it also provides that courts
"may" issue injunctions,'9 not that they must. The Court noted that it
had "consistently rejected invitations to replace traditional principles
of equitable considerations with the rule that an injunction
automatically follows a determination that a copyright has been
infringed."20 In New York Times Co. v. Tasini,21 for instance, the
Court sought to allay concerns about public access to the historical
record by suggesting that the appropriate remedy for unauthorized
inputting of free-lancer articles to electronic databases might be
compensation, rather than an injunction that would require removal
of the articles from the databases.
The Court agreed with the Federal Circuit on one point, however:
that the trial court in eBay had erred by adopting a categorical rule
that injunctive relief was unavailable because of the "plaintiffs
5 Id., citing 35 U.S.C. § 261.
16 eBay, 547 U.S. at 392 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 283).
7 eBay, 547 U.S. at 392 n.2. Although the Court did not quote the whole of this provision, it
is worth noting that it goes on to say that the injunction may "prevent the violation of any
right secured by a patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable." 35 U.S.C. § 283
(2oo6). (emphasis added).
is 17 U.S.C. § 1o6 (2oo6).
19 17 U.S.C. § 502(a) (2oo6).
20 eBay, 547 U.S. at 392-93. Professor Laycock agrees with the Supreme Court in eBay that
a permanent injunction should not automatically issue upon a showing of liability; he
simply contests the view that the four-part test announced in eBay is a traditional test. See
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES (Supp. 2009) (discussing eBay).
2'533 U.S. 483,505 (2001). See also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569,578
n.io (1994) (opining that monetary relief may suffice in close fair use cases where there is a
strong public interest in the availability of a transformative work, even if its author took
more than could be justified as a fair use).
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willingness to license its patents" and "its lack of commercial activity
in practicing the patents," from which the lower court inferred that
harm was not irreparable.22 This rigid rule would preclude injunctive
relief for university researchers or solo inventors who might prefer to
license their patents than to practice their inventions directly. The
Court saw "no basis for categorically denying them the opportunity to
do so."23 The correct approach is to apply traditional principles of
equity in judging whether injunctive relief was appropriate as to a
non-practicing entity. The Federal Circuit had erred in the "opposite
direction," however, by adopting a categorical rule in favor of
injunctions rather than applying traditional principles of equity.4
B. PRESUMING IRREPARABLE HARM IS INCONSISTENT WITH EBAY.
The common practice of presuming irreparable harm in copyright
infringement cases at the preliminary injunction stage is akin to the
categorical rule in favor of injunctions adopted by the Federal Circuit
and rejected by the Court in eBay.
The Court in eBay specifically said that plaintiffs "must
demonstrate" that they have satisfied each of the four factors to
qualify for issuance of an injunction.25 The only plausible
interpretation of this statement is that the plaintiff bears the burden of
proof as to each factor. The first of these factors, as the Court
articulated the test in eBay, is that the plaintiff "has suffered
irreparable injury."26 A presumption of irreparable injury is thus
22aMercExchange LLC v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 712 (E.D. Va. 2005).
23 eBay, 547 U.S. at 393. Justice Kennedy, writing for himself, and Justices Stevens, Souter,
and Breyer, concurred, but pointed out that some non-practicing entities were using the
threat of injunctive relief "as a bargaining tool to charge exorbitant fees." Id. at 396. "When
the patented invention is but a small component of the product the companies seek to
produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in
negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement, and
an injunction may not serve the public interest." Id. at 396-97.
24 Id. at 393-94. Justice Roberts, writing for himself and Justices Ginsburg and Scalia, was,
however, more sanguine about the common historical practice of issuing injunctions in
patent infringement cases. Id. at 394-95.
25d. at 391.
26 Id. The Court should probably have said that plaintiffs must offer proof of the likelihood
of irreparable harm before injunctive relief is granted, rather than proof that the plaintiff
had already suffered irreparable harm, as injunctions are aimed at preventing future
harms. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has characterized the need for the plaintiff to
show the likelihood of irreparable harm as "[p]erhaps the single most important
[Vol. 6: 172
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plainly inconsistent with the requirement that the plaintiff "must
satisfy" a four-factor test which includes the irreparable injury factor
before injunctions can issue.27
While the Court in eBay focused on the appropriate standard for
issuance of a permanent injunction, traditional principles of equity
apply with equal, if not greater, force to preliminary injunctions, as
the Court made clear in Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell,28 a
precedent on which the Court relied in eBay.9 The Court in Amoco
ruled that the trial court had erred in presuming irreparable harm
because this was "contrary to traditional equitable principles."30 The
Court asserted in Amoco that "[t]he standard for a preliminary
injunction is essentially the same as for a permanent injunction with
the exception that the plaintiff must show a likelihood of success on
the merits rather than actual success."31 This principle makes sense
given that the statutory authority for issuance of permanent and
preliminary injunctions does not generally distinguish between them
or establish different tests for issuance of each kind of injunction.32
The requirement that a plaintiff must prove irreparable harm to
qualify for a preliminary injunction does not dissolve merely because
it has shown a likelihood of success on the merits, as the Court
recently confirmed in Winter v. National Resources Defense
Council.33 In Winter, the trial court concluded, and the Ninth Circuit
agreed, that NRDC had made a strong showing of likelihood of success
on the merits of its claim that the Navy's use of sonar equipment in
prerequisite" for injunctive relief See, e.g., Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co.,
719 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 2948 (1973) and numerous cases).
27eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
28 48o U.S. 531 (1987). Amoco involved a challenge to oil exploration conducted without a
thorough study of the impact of the exploration on native Americans. See also Winter v.
Nat'l Resources Defense Council, 129 S.Ct. 365, 375-76 (20o8) (plaintiffs must satisfy all
four equitable criteria to qualify for preliminary injunctions).
29 The Court cited Amoco twice in its eBay decision. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
30 Amoco, 480 U.S. at 545. For a discussion of reasons why courts should be cautious
before issuing preliminary injunctions, see DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE
IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 110-132 (1991).
3' Amoco, 480 U.S. at 546 n.12.
32 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § So2(a); 35 U.S.C. § 283.
33 129 S. Ct. 365 (2008).
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training exercises was not in compliance with certain environmental
laws.34 Both courts thought that "when a plaintiff demonstrates a
strong likelihood of prevailing on the merits, a preliminary injunction
may be entered based only on a 'possibility' of irreparable harm."35
The Supreme Court strongly disagreed. "Issuing a preliminary
injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable harm is
inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive relief as an
extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing
that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief."36 The likelihood of success
on the merits and a showing of irreparable harm are two separate and
independent requirements for the grant of preliminary injunctive
relief, and each must be proven and analyzed separately.
There is, in other words, no intrinsic link between a plaintiffs
likelihood of success on the merits and the need for the plaintiff to
show irreparable harm. Plaintiffs cannot meet their evidentiary
burdens on both factors by proving only the first. Winter thus makes
it obvious that courts should not presume irreparable harm merely
because a copyright owner or patentee has proven a likelihood of
success on the merits.
C. MOST COURTS HAVE FOLLOWED EBAYIN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT
CASES
After eBay, most courts in patent and copyright cases have
recognized that traditional principles of equity must be satisfied
before either preliminary or permanent injunctive relief is granted. In
Canon, Inc. v. GCC Int'l Ltd.,37 for instance, the district court granted
a preliminary injunction against infringement of a patent on a printer
cartridge component, but recognized that eBay requires "the movant
[to] demonstrate the likelihood of irreparable injury in the absence of
a grant of the requested injunction."38 The far-flung nature of the
defendant's enterprises and difficulties in assessing damages specific
34Id. at 375.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 375-76.
37 450 F. Supp. 2d 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
38 Id. at 254.
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to the case provided a basis for concluding that the plaintiff had
satisfied the irreparable injury requirement. 39
Several other patent cases have specifically considered the
inconsistency of the pre-eBay presumption of irreparable injury with
the logic and holding in eBay. In Sun Optics, Inc. v. FGX Int'l, Inc.,40
the court denied the plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction
against infringement and opined that the presumption of irreparable
injury "did not survive eBay."41 A design patentee argued that a
showing of likelihood of success on the merits gave rise to a
presumption of irreparable harm in Torpso Hockey v. Kor Hockey.42
However, the court opined that "eBay's logic forbids courts to
categorically presume irreparable harm in the preliminary injunction
context, even if a patentee has established that it will likely succeed on
the merits."43
In a thoughtful analysis, the trial court in Hologic, Inc. v. Senorx,
Inc. similarly rejected the argument that likelihood of success on the
merits should give rise to a presumption of irreparable injury.44 The
court expressed "doubt[] that the Supreme Court intended for the
presumption to survive for purposes of preliminary injunctions."45 It
reached this conclusion by finding that, just as in the case of
permanent injunctions, "a presumption of irreparable harm in the
preliminary injunction context would appear to replace equitable
considerations with a rule that an injunction . . . automatically follows
a determination that a valid patent has likely been infringed."46 In
Hologic, the District Court found some likelihood of the plaintiffs
success on the merits, but stressed that the degree of that likelihood
had nothing to do with the issue of harm. Even if it had "found
unequivocably [sic] that the evidence preliminarily showed
39 Id. at 255-56.
4o No. 07-137-SLR, 2007 WL 2228569 (D. Del. Aug, 2 2007).
41 Id. at *3. The court noted that eBay had rejected general rules and categorical
approaches to injunctive relief akin to the presumption of irreparable injury. Id. at 1.
42 491 F. Supp. 2d 871 (D. Minn. 2007).
43 Id. at 881.
44 No. C-08-00133RMW, 2008 WL 1860035, at *15 (N.D. Cal. April 25, 2008).
45 Id.
46 Id.
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infringement of a valid patent," the court explained, it "would not
grant a preliminary injunction."47 Several other courts have followed a
similar approach, framing eBay as a broad prohibition against
burden-shifting categorical rules for issuance of injunctions.48
Although most decisions have recognized that eBay has
implications for the issuance of injunctions in copyright cases,49 a few
47 Id. at *14. The court reached this conclusion because it found that the plaintiffs poor
sales prior to patent infringement indicated an inability to penetrate the market; because
any harm that it would suffer from infringement could be compensated with money
damages; and because statements disclosing the defendant's assets indicated that it would
not be likely to be judgment-proof following a full trial. Id. at *16-*17.
48 See, e.g., MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 569 (E.D. Va. 2007)
("traditional equitable principles require the plaintiffto demonstrate that it has suffered an
irreparable injury" and "a presumption of irreparable harm is inconsistent with" this
requirement); IMX, Inc. v. Lendingtree, LLC, 469 F. Supp. 2d 203, 224-26 (D. Del. 2007)
(eBay requires plaintiff to show irreparable injury); Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Teva
Pharms., No. CIV 05-CV-o1877 HAA ES, 2007 WL 2669338, at *13 (D.N.J. Sept. 6,2007)
(holding that under eBay, "on motions for injunctions, courts should not apply categorical
rules and presumptions"); Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:o4CV211DF, 2oo6 WL
2385139, at *4 (E.D. Tex. August 16, 2006) ("The eBay decision demonstrates that no
presumption of irreparable harm should automatically follow from a finding of
infringement."); z4 Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex.
20o6) (refusing to issue permanent injunction because the plaintiff failed to prove
irreparable harm). The Federal Circuit, however, has yet to abjure the presumption of
irreparable injury upon a finding of likelihood of success on the merits in preliminary
injunction patent cases. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 452 F-3d
1331, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (affirming denial of preliminary injunction because plaintiff
had failed to prove likelihood of success on the merits, but suggesting that this failure of
proof was why it was not entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm). See also
Christiana Industries v. Empire Electronics, Inc., 443 F. Supp. 2d 870, 884 (E.D. Mich.
2006) (applying a presumption of irreparable harm in a patent-related preliminary
injunction, saying that "[t]he eBay Court addressed the proper analysis for permanent
injunctive relief).
49 See, e.g., Christopher Phelps & Assoc., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 543 (4th Cir.
2007) (rejecting plaintiffs' argument that they were entitled to permanent injunction
because of the finding of infringement, citing eBay); Jacobsen v. Katzer, 609 F. Supp. 2d
925, 937-938 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (denying preliminary injunction despite likelihood of
success on the merits because plaintiff had failed to prove irreparable harm); Momento,
Inc. v. Seccion Amarilla USA, 2009 WL 1974798 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (granting preliminary
injunction, but recognizing that eBay requires "a plaintiff to demonstrate ... irreparable
injury"); Microsoft Corp. v. AGA Solutions, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 2d 195, 203-204 (E.D.N.Y.
20o8) (denying motion for permanent injunction because plaintiff had failed to prove
irreparable harm from copyright infringement, as eBay required); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1213-14 (N.D. Cal. 2007) ("Based on
eBay and Amoco, there is no language in the text of the Copyright Act that would permit a
departure from traditional equitable principles such that a presumption of irreparable
harm would be allowed in any injunctive context."). See also North American Medical
Corp. v. Axiom worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1227 (11th Cir. 2008) (eBay "calls into
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courts have not been persuaded of eBay's relevance. In Salinger v.
Colting, for instance, the court presumed irreparable harm to the
reclusive writer's interests based on its view that Colting's novel,
which imagined the life of the fictional character Holden Caufield sixty
years later, probably infringed the copyright in Catcher in the Rye and
granted a preliminary injunction against the book's publication.5o The
Salinger decision dismissed the relevance of eBay in a footnote,
saying that "that case dealt only with the presumption of irreparable
harm in the patent law context and is thus not controlling in the
absence of Second Circuit precedent applying it in the copyright
context."51
Given that the Court in eBay explicitly relied upon its prior
copyright decisions for the propositions that courts should not use
categorical rules in issuing injunctions and that courts have discretion
not to issue injunctions in copyright cases in accordance with
traditional principles of equity,52 the Salinger presumption of
irreparable injury seems plainly erroneous.53
More elaborate, but equally flawed, was the reasoning in a
footnote in Lennon v. Premise Media Corp. explaining why the trial
court believed that the pre-eBay presumption of irreparable harm was
still appropriate in copyright preliminary injunction cases. 54 We agree
question whether courts may presume irreparable harm merely because a plaintiff in an
intellectual property case has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits").
5 No. 09 CIV. 5095DAB, 2009 WL 1916354 at *16 (S.D.N.Y. July 1, 2009). More equivocal
was the approach in Warner Bros. Ent'm't, Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513,;552
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (recognizing that "there is some question of whether the presumption of
irreparable harm still applies" after eBay, but then going on to discuss evidence that would
support a finding of irreparable harm). The court in Warner cited two peer-to-peer file-
sharing cases as having presumed irreparable harm when issuing permanent injunctions.
See Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc. v. Carsagno, No. o6 CV 2676NG (RLM)), 2007 WL
1655666, at *4-*6 (E.D.N.Y. Jun. 4,2007) and UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Blake, No. 5o6-
CV-OO12o-BR, 2007 WL 1853956, at *2-*3 (E.D.N.C. Jun. 26, 2007).
5lSalinger, 2009 WL 1916354, at *16, n. 6. The Salinger case is discussed at greater length
infra at notes 107-13 and accompanying text.
P2eBay, 547 U.S. at 391-92.
s3 The ruling in Salinger is on appeal to the Second Circuit. We predict that the appellate
court will reverse for failure to analyze the factors necessary to establish a basis for
issuance of a preliminary injunction. Colting's appeal should be helped by the brief amicus
curiae submitted by the New York Times and other news organizations. See NY Times
Brief, supra note 4.
54 556 F. Supp. ad 310, 319 n.i (S.D.N.Y. 2oo8) (defendant failed to offer evidence to rebut
a presumption of irreparable harm in decision denying preliminary injunction). Neither in
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with the conclusion that Premise made a fair use of the short clip it
took from John Lennon's song "Imagine" for a documentary film on
bias against religion among proponents of the theory of evolution,55
and hence, the motion for preliminary injunction against distribution
of the film was properly denied. However, the court in Lennon is
simply incorrect in asserting that eBay only applies to standards for
issuance of permanent injunctions.56 Also specious is its assertion that
Salinger nor in Lennon did the court offer a justification for presuming irreparable harm in
preliminary injunction copyright cases. One possible rationale for the presumption would
focus on the nature of the copyright grant which provides owners with rights to exclude
and which an injunction would vindicate. However, this argument would seem to be
foreclosed by eBay, 547 U.S. at 392 (rejecting the Federal Circuit's nature-of-the-grant
rationale for its automatic injunction rule). A second rationale might focus on the difficulty
of measuring damages in copyright cases and the risk that rights holders may not get
adequate relief without an injunction. Professor David McGowan has endorsed this
rationale for retaining this presumption post-eBay. See David McGowan, Irreparable
Harm, 14 LEWiS & CLARK L. REv. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 9-10) (invoking
immeasurability as a justification for the presumption of irreparable harm). However,
insofar as this is presented as a categorical rule, it also seems inconsistent with eBay. If the
plaintiff can show why harm is immeasurable, that may well satisfy her burden of proof on
irreparability of harm, but in that case, she doesn't need the presumption. A third rationale
might be based on a theory that the preliminary injunction only seeks to preserve the
status quo. However, this is not always, and perhaps not even generally, true. Many
copyright lawsuits challenge conduct that is already happening in the marketplace. See,
e.g., Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (challenge to inclusion of articles in electronic databases without
permission from free-lancers); Lennon, 556 F. Supp.2d 310 (seeking to enjoin motion
picture that had been released into the marketplace); Mattel, Inc. v. Pitt, 229 F. Supp. 2d
315 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (challenge to modified Barbie doll). A fourth rationale might focus on
judicial economy. See, e.g., McGowan, supra, at *5 (concluding that eBay does not
foreclose this rationale for presuming irreparable harm). The presumption certainly
relieves copyright plaintiffs from the burden of bringing forward evidence of irreparable
harm and judges from having to assess the merits. However, when plaintiffs ask for
extraordinary remedies, requiring them to offer of some proof about harm seems a
reasonable burden, especially in light of Supreme Court precedents. The burden of proof of
the irreparability of harm may well be lighter when the defendant has made exact or near
exact copies that are drawing away sales from the plaintiffs work, see infra note 97 and
accompanying text, but this is not a sound reason to do away with the need for the plaintiff
to make some sort of showing about the irreparability of harm.
55Lennon, 556 F. Supp.2d at 327.
56 Id. at 319 n.1. This footnote in Lennon also argues that the presumption of irreparable
harm is only one consideration in decisions about whether to issue injunctions, and so
eBay doesn't apply because courts in copyright cases may still exercise discretion in
denying preliminary injunctions. Id. But a presumption of irreparable injury is, as we have
shown above, a categorical rule that shifts to the defendant a burden to show what the
eBay decision says a plaintiff must demonstrate. See supra Part II-B. The Lennon decision
also cited to the Second Circuit's decision in Time Warner Cable Co. v. DIRECTV!, Inc., 497
F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 2007) as preserving a presumption of irreparable harm in a false
advertising case, but the court there articulated a general rule that likelihood of injury
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the presumption of irreparable harm is warranted in preliminary
injunction cases because "a court deciding whether to impose a
permanent injunction has before it the full record after judgment on
the merits, [while] the record on a motion for a preliminary injunction
is to some degree incomplete."57 In our view, the incompleteness of
the record at the preliminary injunction stage cuts against issuance of
an injunction, not in favor of it.
Consider the concerns the Supreme Court had in Amoco about the
risks of erroneous rulings posed by incomplete evidence at the
preliminary injunction stage. The Court pointed out that a plaintiff at
the preliminary injunction stage already bears a lighter burden and
must show only "a likelihood of success on the merits rather than
actual success."s8 Because the assessment of a likelihood of success
will generally be based on incomplete information, courts should be
more careful in assessing irreparability of harm before issuing
preliminary injunctions because of the risk that the preliminary
assessment on the merits may be mistaken.59
The likelihood of success factor might, for instance, tip only
slightly in favor of the plaintiff; if she offers no evidence that harm will
be irreparable, but relies only on the presumption of irreparable harm,
the risk is substantial that the court will have made a mistake issuing
the injunction insofar as the harm is minimal or only speculative. 6o
The whole point of having a multi-factor test for analyzing whether to
grant this extraordinary remedy would be lost if eligibility for
preliminary injunctions boiled down to a necessarily incomplete
assessment focused only on the likelihood of success on the merits. 61
The presumption of irreparable harm in copyright cases is,
moreover, of relatively recent vintage and of dubious soundness, even
cannot be presumed, offering a specific rationale for an exception in cases involving false
statements in advertisements.
57 Lennon, 556 F. Supp.2d at 319, n.i.
58 Amoco, 480 U.S. at 546, n.12.
59 See, e.g., Allora LLC v. Brownstone, Inc., No. 1:o7CV87, 2007 WL 1246448, at *7-8
(W.D.N.C. April 27, 2007). See also LAYCOCK, supra note 110-32, chap. 5.
6o Allora, 2007 WL 1246448, at *7 (harm irreparable only if it is "actual and imminent,"
not "remote [or] speculative").
6i Part III-B discusses the troubling implications of incomplete findings and risks of
erroneous issuance of preliminary injunctions in transformative use cases.
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without eBay.62 But eBay is, in any event, the controlling precedent,
and a presumption of irreparable injury to the plaintiff in preliminary
injunction copyright cases cannot be reconciled with eBay and the
Court's other precedents which emphasize the importance of applying
traditional principles of equity in assessing the appropriateness of
injunctive relief.63
III. PRESUMING IRREPARABLE HARM IS PARTICULARLY INAPPROPRIATE
IN TRANSFORMATIVE USE CASES
Even if we leave aside the forceful arguments presented in Part I
about the inconsistency of the irreparable harm presumption in
preliminary injunction cases with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
on injunction standards, another strong reason to reject this
presumption in copyright preliminary injunction cases is that it
undermines the constitutional values of U.S. copyright law when
applied to transformative works, such as clips of songs or movies in
documentary films or in user-generated content.64 Transformative use
cases often raise subtle questions of fair use and other non-
infringement defenses; moreover, harm is likely to be minimal,
speculative, or remediable through monetary compensation in
transformative as compared to non-transformative use cases.6s
62See, e.g., PATRY, supra note 1, at § 22:45-22:51. Patry strongly criticizes this presumption
and the way courts have used it to shift the burden of proof on the irreparability of harm to
the defendant. Id. at § 22:46-22:47. He notes that "compelling [a] plaintiff to establish
actual evidence of irreparable harm is consistent with the general rule that where the facts
relating to a disputed issue lie peculiarly within the knowledge of one party, placing the
burden of proof on his or her adversary is unfair. Nowhere is this principle more
appropriately applied then [sic] where one party claims irreparable harm." Id. at § 22:47.
63 Id. at § 22:44 (eBay "has thrown the presumption [of irreparable harm] into grave
doubt"). See also NIMMER, supra note 1, at sec. 4-1415] ("The Supreme Court's decision in
eBay caused a new day to dawn....No longer applicable is the presumption of irreparable
harm, which allowed the collapse of factors down to one."). See also Richard Dannay,
Copyright Injunctions and Fair Use: Enter eBay-Four-Factor Fatigue or Four-Factor
Freedom?, 55 J. COP. SOC'Y 449, 460 (2007) ("For either preliminary or permanent
injunctions, []eBay would appear to prohibit any presumption of irreparable harm as
contrary to traditional equitable principles.").
64 See, e.g., Peter Jaszi, Copyright, Fair Use, and Motion Pictures, 2007 UTAH L. REv. 715
(giving examples of creative transformations in documentary films); Rebecca Tushnet,
User-Generated Discontent: Transformation in Practice, 31 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 497
(2008) (discussing various kinds of creative transformations in user-generated works).
65 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994) (market harm less
easily inferred in transformative use cases). See also NY Times Brief, supra note 4, at 2-3
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The presumption of irreparable harm in copyright preliminary
injunction cases is akin to the presumption against commercial user
fair use claims first announced in Sony Corp. ofAm. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 66 but later repudiated in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc.67 The logic and motivation for the Campbell Court's rejection of
the Sony commercial use unfairness presumption are pertinent to
whether a presumption of irreparable harm is proper in
transformative use cases.68 Requiring plaintiffs to produce evidence of
irreparable harm in transformative use cases rather than simply
presuming it is also more consistent with the First Amendment values
that fair use and the idea/expression distinction are supposed to
embody.69
A. THE SUPREME COURT HAS ALREADY REJECTED PRESUMPTIONS OF
HARM IN THE CLOSELY RELATED AREA OF FAIR USE ANALYSIS
Sony is understandably best known for its ruling that a technology
developer could not be held contributorily liable for copyright
infringement merely because it sold video tape recording devices that
some customers were using to infringe copyrights.7o Sony has,
however, also been widely cited for its endorsement, albeit in dicta, of
("transformative commentary" should be treated "far different[ly]" than "sheer piracy" in
copyright preliminary injunction cases); Molly Shaffer van Houweling, Distributive Values
in Copyright, 83 TEXAS L. REv. 1535 (2005) (recommending greater breathing room for
amateur transformative creators).
66 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
67510 U.S. 569 (1994).
68 Id. at 591 ("No 'presumption' or inference of market harm that might find support in
Sony is applicable to a case involving something beyond mere duplication for commercial
purposes.")
69 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 190-191 (2003) (characterizing fair use and the
idea/expression distinction as two safeguards for free speech and free expression interests
built into copyright law). See also NY Times Brief, supra note 4, at 4-18 (arguing that
preliminary injunctions in transformative use cases are prior restraints on speech that are
presumptively unconstitutional); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2537, 2546-80 (2009) (discussing free expression and free speech interests
manifest in the fair use case law).
70 See, e.g., Fred von Lohmann, Fair Use as Innovation Policy, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
829 (2oo8) (discussing Sony's legacy for technology developers).
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a significant shortcut in the analysis of fair use.71 The Court in Sony
opined that "every commercial use of copyrighted material is
presumptively an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that
belongs to the owner of the copyright."72 It went on to say that "[i]f the
intended use is for commercial gain, th[e] likelihood [of harm to the
market] may be presumed."73
This dual presumption against fair use in commercial use cases
took on greater significance when the Court re-endorsed it in Harper
& Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises.74 Harper & Row sued
the Nation for copyright infringement because this commercial
enterprise had published a magazine which included an article
consisting largely of quotes and paraphrases of statements from
Gerald Ford's about-to-be-published memoirs of his Presidency. In
Harper & Row, the Court quoted the Sony dicta that the commercial
nature of a use, such as the Nation's, should be treated as
presumptively unfair.75 Harm to the market from the Nation's
"scooping" of the excerpts from the Ford memoirs could likewise be
presumed.76
Once amplified by Harper & Row, the Sony presumption caused
some courts to give short shrift to fair use defenses in commercial use
cases without careful and thorough fair use analysis. Judge Pierre
Leval was among the many critics of the Sony presumption, saying
that as a result of courts' applying it,
[t]he public, which is the intended beneficiary of the
copyright law, lost the publication of a number of
illuminating historical works. Other works that were
71 See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985);
Acuff-Rose Music., Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 1992), rev'd sub nom.,
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
72Sony, 450 U.S. at 451. Sony involved private non-commercial copying (that is, time-shift
copying of television programs shown on broadcast television), which the Court opined
should be presumed to be fair. Id.
73 Id.
74471 U.S. 539 (1985).
75 Id. at 562 (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 451).
76 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 567-68. The Cout also relied on the cancellation of an
arrangement with Time Magazine to publish excerpts to whet the public's appetite for the
Ford memoirs. Id.
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published were less valuable and interesting than they
might otherwise have been because of the suppression
of interesting material that might lose in a fair use
tussle in which no one understood the rules.77
Jessica Litman likewise observed that "[t]he presumption against
commercial fair use quickly proved unworkable, making fair use
unavailable to biographers, parodists, and news organizations because
they published their works for commercial gain."78 It became evident
that the Court would need to revisit the Sony presumption, and it did
so in Campbell.
Campbell made clear that commercial uses should not
automatically be presumed unfair,79 especially as to "transformative"
uses of pre-existing works, such as the rap parody of a well-known
song in that case. A transformative use, the Court stated, was one that
"adds something new, with a further purpose or different character,
altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message."so
Although non-transformative uses might also qualify as fair, the Court
perceived the creation of transformative works as furthering "the goal
of copyright to promote science and the arts."1 Transformative works
"lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing space
within the confines of copyright."82
After Campbell, it is inappropriate to presume harm to the
plaintiffs market when commercial uses are transformative in
character. 83 Transformative uses do not generally supplant demand
77 Pierre N. Leval, Campbell v. Acuff-Rose: Justice Souter's Rescue ofFair Use, 13
CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19, 21-22 (1994).
78 Jessica Litman, The Sony Paradox, 55 CASE W. L. REV. 917, 949 (2005).
79 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583-84.
So Id. at 579. The Court's definition of "transformative uses" is best understood as
encompassing three categories of uses: those that truly transform expression from an
earlier work (as in a parody), those that make productive uses of expression from pre-
existing works (as when a biographer quotes from an earlier work to prove a point), and
orthogonal uses (as when the earlier work is used for an entirely different purpose than the
original). Samuelson, Unbundling, supra note 69, at 2548-58. Substantial free expression
and free speech interests may be present in all three types of uses that the Court has
bundled within the term "transformative uses."
S Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
52Id
83Id. at 591.
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for the original work, which is why they are more likely than non-
transformative uses to be fair.84 "No 'presumption' or inference of
market harm that might find support in Sony," the Court stated, "is
applicable to a case involving something beyond mere duplication for
commercial purposes."85 Rather, the Court held that the fair use "calls
for case-by-case analysis."86
Courts analyzing fair use defenses in transformative use cases
after Campbell have sometimes been persuaded that market harm
claims, once analyzed instead of presumed, lack merit. Some
plaintiffs, for instance, have been unable to show that a potential
market existed for the allegedly infringing use to usurp.87 Even when a
potential market does exist, the court may find no market harm
because the copyright holder may have no intention of entering that
market.88 A transformative use might also be too insubstantial to pose
a serious threat to the original work.89 Or the market for the work in
question may be too remote from the market for the original.90
The Court in Campbell also made clear that courts should be wary
of issuing injunctions in transformative use cases, even if the use is
ultimately found infringing, when money damages would be an
adequate remedy.91 Considering monetary relief as an alternative to an
injunction is particularly appropriate when there is a potentially
84Id.
85 Id.
861d- at 577.
87See, e.g., Mathieson v. Associated Press, 1992 WL 164447 at *8-*9 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(finding "[in]sufficient evidence to show that a 'potential market' exists for the
photographs at issue); Video-Cinema Films, Inc. v. Cable News Network, Inc., 2003 WL
1701904 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding no effect on potential market because "[p]laintiff
failed to establish that any such market for licensing film clips for obituaries ever existed").
88 See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 8o6 (9 th Cir. 2003)(finding no market harm because plaintiff is likely neither to enter a "market for adult-
oriented artistic photographs of Barbie," nor to "license others to do so").
89 See, e.g., Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 739 (2d Cir. 1991) (because
"marginal amounts of expressive content were taken . . . . [i]mpairment of the market ... is
unlikely").
9o See, e.g., Narell v. Freedman, 872 F.2d 907, 914 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Readers interested in
Narell's book are highly unlikely to find historical romance novels an acceptable
substitute.").
91 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 n.10.
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strong public interest in access to the second work for the creative
contribution it makes to the progress of knowledge.2 Just as
Campbell's central holding requires courts to conduct a close, case-by-
case analysis of the market harm factor of the fair-use test, the
Campbell liability rule dictum suggests that courts ought to be
similarly cautious in analyzing harm rather than presuming it in
copyright cases.
The standard for irreparable harm in preliminary injunction
copyright cases is not, of course, identical to the market harm prong of
the fair use analysis, but there is substantial overlap in their focus on
harm and the need for an assessment of the risks that certain uses will
harm the market for protected works. In both contexts, courts must
consider the likelihood that harm will occur, how measurable the
harm may be, and its significance. Requiring plaintiffs in
transformative use cases to prove irreparable harm before qualifying
for preliminary injunctive relief will not impose an undue burden on
them, for many circumstances may give rise to an inference that harm
will be irreparable.
Harm is generally considered irreparable when an award of
monetary damages would be insufficient to address the wrong.93 Such
an insufficiency may exist when it is difficult to ascertain the proper
amount of monetary compensation due.94 Harm that defies easy
92 Id. (suggesting that courts should "bear in mind that the goals of copyright law, 'to
stimulate the creation and publication of edifying matter,' [citation omitted], are not
always best served by automatically granting injunctive relief when parodists are found to
have gone beyond the bounds of fair use," in part because there may be a strong public
interest in access to the second work).
93 See, e.g., Wildmon v. Berwick Universal Pictures, 983 F.2d 21, 24 (5th Cir. 1992)
(describing irreparable injury as one "for which compensatory damages are unsuitable");
Hughes Network Systems, Inc. v. InterDigital Communications Corp., 17 F-3d 691, 694
(4th Cir. 1994) ("Where the harm suffered by the moving party may be compensated by an
award of money damages at judgment, courts generally have refused to find that harm
irreparable."). It is an interesting question whether open source developers should be
entitled to preliminary or permanent injunctive relief when wrongdoers incorporate open
source code into proprietary products because money damages will not suffice to remedy
the harm to the open source community arising from breaches of open source licenses. We
thank Brian Carver for this thought.
94 See, e.g., Allied Marketing Group, Inc. v. CDL Marketing, Inc., 878 F.2d 8o6, 81o n.1
(5th Cir. 1989) (recognizing irreparable harm where "economic rights are involved when
the nature of those rights makes establishment of the dollar value of the loss ... especially
difficult or speculative") (internal quotes omitted). Professor Laycock believes that
damages in copyright cases often are irreparable as "[d]amages cannot be used to replace a
state of the world in which the copyright has not been infringed, and damages can rarely be
measured with any accuracy. How many sales the copyright holder lost is usually a
speculative number. How many sales the defendant made (restitution, not damages) is
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calculation and can rightly be called irreparable tends either to
undermine the plaintiffs business to a significant extent, or to
compromise its ability to obtain a money judgment.95
Consider, for instance, Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc.,96 in
which the Seventh Circuit upheld a finding of irreparable harm when
the defendant copied and marketed nearly identical toys to those sold
by the plaintiff. GMA's invasion of Ty's core market risked causing
serious losses of profits, market share, and good will whose monetary
value would be difficult to calculate with precision.97 The court
acknowledged that the existence of a licensing market would
ordinarily allow calculation of damages and militate against a finding
of irreparable harm, but perceived this case to be different. Here, Ty's
business strategy relied on strictly limiting the supply and distribution
of Beanie Babies toys, the better to drive up demand and resale value.
Accordingly, Ty rarely issued licenses. By interfering with this strategy
through infringement, the court found, GMA threatened injury to Ty's
market beyond the mere cost of a license.98
Other scenarios where infringement may irreparably threaten the
plaintiffs business include cases where the nature of the copyrighted
work means there is but a limited time for exploitation. In Atari, Inc.
v. North American Phillips Consumer Electronics Corp.,99 the
Seventh Circuit found that the plaintiff, a video game manufacturer,
had offered ample evidence of irreparable harm without aid of the
presumption, as the injury from infringement was compounded by
"[t]he short-lived nature of video games."100 Seasonal works, likely to
go out of style after a short amount of time, also fall into this
category.10 ' Courts should also consider the threat of insolvency of
usually a real and knowable number, but the apportionment problems in measuring
defendant's profits are notoriously difficult.-. ." Laycock Letter, supra note 8, at 2.
95 See generally PATRY, supra note 1, §§ 22:37-40.
96 132 F.3d 1167 (7th Cir. 1997).
97 See James M. Fischer, What Hath eBay v. MercExchange Wrought?, 14 LEwIS & CLARK
L. REv. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 'o) (harm likely to be irreparable as to
infringement that invades the plaintiffs core market).
98 Ty, 132 F-3d at 1172-73.
99 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1982).
100 Id. at 620.
1o1 PATRY, supra note 1, at § 22:39.
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either the plaintiff or the defendant as pertinent to irreparable
harm.102
In many cases involving highly transformative works,
infringement may be uncertain and harm to the market quite
speculative. A second work's transformative character will typically
mean it will not supplant the work in its the core market nor in
proximate markets. The Supreme Court acknowledged this in
Campbell, noting that, in the context of the fair use test, "when . . . the
second use is transformative ... market harm may not be so readily
inferred."103 The Ninth Circuit expressed a similar sentiment in Kelly
v. Arriba Soft Corp.,104 which found that thumbnail images of
photographs displayed by a search engine did not threaten markets
for the photos.1o5 The court explained that generally, "[a]
transformative work is less likely to have an adverse impact on the
market of the original than a work that merely supersedes the
copyrighted work."106
Unfortunately, some courts have failed to recognize this. In
Salinger v. Colting,107 for instance, the court granted a preliminary
injunction forbidding Colting to publish his book mainly because the
court thought Salinger was likely to succeed on the merits.1os In its
analysis of fair use, the court gave little weight to the fact that Colting
had imaginatively recast Salinger's character in a wholly new novel
that was highly transformative.o9
The court in Salinger speculated that publication of Colting's
novel "could substantially harm the market for a Catcher sequel or
other derivative works."llo This ignores that Salinger had, over the
course of many years, shown no interest in writing a sequel of any
kind or of authorizing a sequel, which is why the court understandably
102 Id. at § 22:40.
103 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591.
104 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
105 Id. at 820-21.
o6d. at 821.
107 2009 WL 1916354 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
io8 Id. at *16.
109 See id. at *8-*9-
no Id. at *14-
872010]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
concluded that the degree of market harm was "slight[]."'111
Notwithstanding this finding, the novel's transformative character,
and the dictum in Campbell cautioning against presuming harm as to
transformative uses, the court proceeded to presume irreparable harm
and to issue a preliminary injunction.112 Had Salinger been required to
prove irreparable harm, the court would have had to give some weight
and attention to its own finding that the risk of any market harm-
whether compensable by money damages or not-was merely slight.113
The use of a presumption of irreparable harm in copyright
preliminary injunction cases threatens a wide swath of transformative
uses of copyrighted works in user-generated remixes and mashups,
which make use of clips from movies and music, even though these
transformative uses are unlikely to harm the market for the works
from which they draw.114 Re-editing scenes from a film to create a
spoof trailer for a movie with a wholly different plot does not, we
think, supplant demand for the original."1 Nor will making a 30-
second YouTube clip of one's child dancing to a Prince song interfere
with the entertainer's ability to make a living.116 It is inappropriate to
presume irreparable harm to user-generated content because this
risks enjoining creative uses that pose no meaningful likelihood of
harm to copyright markets.
in Id. at *15. Insofar as Salinger's objection to Colting's novel is rooted in his desire to
protect his characters from "mutilation" in the hands of authors such as Colting, such an
objection should not be given weight in U.S. copyright cases because U.S. law does not
protect the moral rights of literary authors.
112 Id. at *15-*16. We agree with the Eleventh Circuit in Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin
Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1276 (11t Cir. 2001) that it is inappropriate to presume irreparable
harm when a defendant raises a plausible fair use defense in a transformative use copyright
case. See also NY Times Brief, supra note 4, at 25-26.
"3 Salinger, 2009 WL 1916354, at *2 6-*2 7 (noting that the record was "barren of any
specific harm, let alone monetary harm, to the plaintiff at all" and that monetary relief
would be adequate, even if Colting's use was infringing).
"4 See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 64, Part III (discussing noncommercial remixes and
mashups).
"s See, e.g., David M. Halbfinger, His 'Secret'Movie Trailer Is No Secret Anymore, NEW
YORK TIMES, Sep. 30, 2005, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/o9/3o/movies/3oshin.html. Though professionally made,
the work in question spawned a host of user-generated imitations.
ii6 Cf. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1151-1152 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
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B. ENJOINING TRANSFORMATIVE USES WITHOUT REQUIRING PROOF OF
IRREPARABLE HARM IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Issuing preliminary injunctions to prevent the dissemination of
highly transformative works, such as user-generated content or the
Colting novel, suppresses the transformative users' own creative
contributions and ability to express him- or herself freely.117 Just as
the Sony commercial unfairness presumption sometimes caused
courts to be blind to commercial uses that might qualify as fair uses,
the presumption of irreparable harm in transformative use cases is an
unwarranted thumb on the scales of justice because it tips the scales
too strongly in the plaintiffs favor. This may cause courts to enjoin a
use without careful reflection about whether a follow-on creator might
have a viable First Amendment interest worthy of vigorous protection.
Requiring plaintiffs to prove that they will be irreparably harmed
offers an important procedural safeguard against unreasonable
restraints on free expression interests of follow-on creators.118
In many areas of law, including obscenity,119 defamation,120 even
state secrets, 121 courts have refused to enjoin potentially illegal speech
because an injunction would constitute an unconstitutional prior
restraint. The Supreme Court observed in Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations that "[ t]he special vice
of a prior restraint is that communication will be suppressed . . .
before an adequate determination that it is unprotected by the First
Amendment."122 Prior restraints, according to the Court in Nebraska
117 See, e.g., NY Times Brief, supra note 4, at 5-18.
us Id. at 17 (pointing out the need for "procedural and substantive protections which
fundamental constitutional doctrine demand must be scrupulously considered before
implementing such a harsh and unfavored remedy" as a preliminary injunction in
transformative use cases).
119 See, e.g., Vance v. Universal Amusement Co. Inc., 455 U.S. 308 (1980); Fort Wayne
Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46 (1989).
120 See, e.g., St. Margaret Mercy Healthcare Ctrs., Inc. v. Ho, 663 N.E.2d 1220 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1996) (applying U.S. Supreme Court precedent on prior restraints in case involving
state defamation law).
121 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971)
122 413 U.S. 376, 390 (1973)-
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Press Ass'n v. Stuart,123 are "the most serious and the least tolerable
infringement on First Amendment rights."124
Professors Mark Lemley and Eugene Volokh have shown that
preliminary injunctions in copyright cases have all the relevant
characteristics of prior restraints on speech and ought to be subject to
the same First Amendment protections as other speech has been.125
Merely designating copyright as a property right, they maintain, is
wholly insufficient to distinguish it from other speech regulations that
courts unquestioningly acknowledge as prior restraints. Accordingly,
"content-based laws, specifically targeted at speech, must be seen as
speech restrictions regardless of whether one frames them as
'property' rules."126
When the use in question is transformative, the defendant's
speech interest is particularly strong. In Eldred v. Ashcroft,127 the
Supreme Court reiterated the notion that copyright law contains built-
in First Amendment safeguards in the form of the fair use defense and
the idea/expression distinction.128 Because transformative users often
raise plausible fair use or other non-infringement defenses, they are in
greater need than non-transformative commercial users of procedural
safeguards to ensure that First Amendment interests of these follow-
on creators are adequately respected.
The Court in Eldred stated that "[t]he First Amendment securely
protects the freedom to make . . . one's own speech; it bears less
heavily when speakers assert the right to make other people's
speeches."129 Insofar as transformative and non-transformative use of
123 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
124 Id. at 559.
125 Lemley & Volokh, supra note 4.
126 Id. at 184; see also Samuelson, Principles, supra note 4, at 8o8-11 (questioning
property-based rationales for enjoining public disclosure of trade secrets when the
defendant raises plausible First Amendment defenses).
127 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
12sId. at 191.
129 Id. Free speech and expression interests are, however, not the only significant values
that may be undermined when irreparable harm is presumed at the preliminary injunction
stage. Competition and innovation interests of follow-on creators and autonomy interests
of consumers may also be implicated in copyright preliminary injunction cases, as when
copyright owners seek to enjoin the distribution of a technology that allows consumers to
make new and possibly infringing uses of their works. See von Lohmann, supra note 70, at
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speech interests lie along a spectrum, the speech interest of follow-on
creators will typically increase as these uses becomes more
transformative and the creative contribution of the second creators is
more extensive. As long as the presumption of irreparable harm
remains in force, however, the preliminary injunction test will fail to
give the second creator's interest due regard.
If any presumption of irreparable harm should arise in
transformative use preliminary injunction cases, it is one that should
recognize the free speech and free expression interests of
transformative users that would be curtailed if the injunction issues.
In Elrod v. Burns,130 the Supreme Court held that "[t]he loss of First
Amendment freedoms, even for minimal periods of time,
unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury."'3' A presumption of
irreparable harm in favor of the first author prevents courts from
recognizing and assessing the harm that an injunction may cause to
follow-on creators. In this way, it undermines copyright's First
Amendment protections, to which a full, factor-by-factor analysis at
the preliminary injunction stage could give effect.132
The crux of the preliminary injunction standard often lies in the
court's balancing of the plaintiffs and defendant's potential exposure
to harm. In an influential article, Professor Leubsdorf argued that
because courts typically rule on preliminary injunctions before the
factual record can be fully developed, "the preliminary injunction
standard should aim to minimize the probable irreparable loss of
rights caused by errors incident to hasty decision."33 Leubsdorf's
theory stresses that courts should weigh not only the degree of
irreparable harm that the plaintiff potentially faces, but also the
likelihood that, if the court issues an injunction in error, "the
833-38 (giving numerous examples of technologies to enable personal use copying of
copyrighted works to which copyright owners might object).
130 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
131 Id. at 373. Courts have sometimes also insisted upon higher standards of proof before
preliminary injunctions issue when defendants have raised plausible First Amendment
defenses in intellectual property cases. See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1316
(1994) (requiring proof of high probability of success on the merits and grave and
irreparable harm). See also Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 225-
26 (6th Cir. 1996) (characterizing preliminary injunction against disclosure of alleged trade
secret as prior restraint bearing heavy burden of unconstitutionality).
132 See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 30, at 164-68 (discussing First Amendment
considerations that may weigh against issuance of injunctions).
133 Leubsdorf, supra note 8, at 540-41.
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defendant may sustain precisely the same loss of his rights" as the
plaintiff.134 Numerous courts have followed the lead of the Seventh
Circuit in American Hospital Supply Corp. v. Hospital Products
Ltd.135 by perceiving Leubsdorfs theory to capture the key balancing
challenge they face when ruling on preliminary injunction motions.136
Just as the Sony presumption of unfairness in commercial use
cases prevented courts from properly analyzing some fair use
defenses, the presumption of irreparable harm whittles the
preliminary injunction test down to a single question of likelihood of
success on the merits.137 As Lemley and Volokh observe, "[i]f
[likelihood of success] can be demonstrated, a preliminary injunction
is the expected remedy."138 Treatise author William Patry asserts that
"too many courts in copyright cases have handled the balance of
hardships abysmally."39 Patry singles out for especially harsh
criticism the Ninth Circuit, where upon a strong showing of likely
success on the merits, the presumption of irreparable harm "kicks into
overdrive."140 The Ninth Circuit has opined that the presumption
134 Id. at 541.
135 780 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1986). In American Hospital, Judge Posner distilled Leubsdorfs
theory into a mathematical formula which he claimed served to illustrate the relationship
among the factors that courts must consider. Accordingly, some commentators now refer
to the standard as the Leubsdorf-Posner theory.
136 See, e.g., Thomas R. Lee, Preliminary Injunctions and the Status Quo, 58 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 109, 156 nn. 276-77, 157 (2001) (collecting cases and observing that "the conceptual
goal mapped out by Leubsdorf and refined by Posner finds almost no detractors or
competitors in the academy or in federal jurisprudence"). See also Joshua P. Davis, Taking
Uncertainty Seriously: Revising Injunction Doctrine, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 363, 367 n. 20
(2003) (observing that "[r]eliance on an analysis fundamentally akin to Leubsdorf's
framework is now common in federal courts" and collecting cases). For reasons explained
in Part II, we believe that the Supreme Court's eBay and post-eBay jurisprudence requires
that plaintiffs bear the burden of proof on all factors pertinent to injunctive relief, see
supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text; however, the Leubsdorf-Posner framework
more closely approximates the standard the Court has recently adopted than the appellate
court practice of presuming harm in copyright cases whenever plaintiffs have established a
likelihood of success on the merits.
137 See, e.g., NIMMER, supra note 1, at § 14.o6[A][2][b] (under the predominant test, "the
plaintiffs burden for obtaining a preliminary injunction in copyright cases reduces to a
showing of likelihood of success on the merits").
138 Lemley & Volokh, supra note 4, at 159.
39 PATRY. supra note 1, at §22:62.
140 Id.
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"means that the balance of hardships issue cannot be accorded
significant-if any-weight in determining whether a court should
enter a preliminary injunction."41 This is difficult to square with the
First Amendment when speech interests of a transformative user are
at stake.142
Applying the full multi-factor balancing test when plaintiffs in
copyright cases seek preliminary injunctions would be more respectful
of transformative users' First Amendment rights. However, even
enforcing eBay's requirement that plaintiffs must prove irreparable
harm would go a long way to rectifying the problem. After all, the
potential for harm to the plaintiff will tend to diminish as the
transformative character of a use, and with it the defendant's speech
interest, increases. And if there is to be any presumption involved in
the inquiry, the Supreme Court's clear designation of loss of First
Amendment rights as irreparable harm would seem to require that
courts presume irreparable harm to the defendant for the suppression
of his or her speech.
IV. CONCLUSION
Copyright owners who seek preliminary injunctions should be
required to prove that they will be irreparably harmed unless the court
grants their request for an injunction in keeping with the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence on the application of traditional principles of
equity, and in particular with eBay. Proof, rather than a presumption,
is a particularly important procedural safeguard in copyright law
because a preliminary injunction can prohibit speech before a trial on
the merits in contravention of a defendant's First Amendment
rights.143 Courts in other areas of law, like defamation, routinely deny
such injunctions, recognizing that silencing speech before its legal
141 See Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115, 1119 (9th Cir. 1999)
(internal quotations and citations omitted). See also PlayMedia Systems, Inc. v. Am.
Online, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (citing Sun Microsystems for
quoted proposition).
142 NIMMER, supra note 1, at § 14.06[A][I][b] ("The frequency of copyright TROs and
injunctions against expressive material under the copyright rubric is surprising when
juxtaposed against the reluctance of courts to engage in prior restraints on speech under
the analysis mandated by the First Amendment."). First Amendment interests of
defendants should be taken into account in the balance of hardships factor in judging
whether to issue preliminary injunctions in copyright cases. Laycock Letter, supra note 8,
at 3
143 See, e.g., NY Times Brief, supra note 4, at 3-18.
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status can be fully determined would constitute an impermissible
prior restraint.144 In copyright, such concerns are similarly acute
wherever a defendant has created a transformative work that raises a
close question of fair use or the idea/expression dichotomy. Courts
and commentators have long recognized that both of these doctrines
serve in part to strike a definitional balance between the seemingly
conflicting imperatives of the Copyright Act and the First
Amendment.145
This loss of protection is not merely theoretical. The Supreme
Court has previously recognized that presumptions of harm can cause
courts to overreach and find harm where little exists. In Campbell, the
Court repudiated the Sony presumption, whereby courts considering
fair use defenses presumed that the commercial use of a work harmed
the market for the original work. The presumption of irreparable
harm for preliminary injunctions parallels the Sony presumption of
unfairness in commercial use cases that Campbell rejected. The
presumption of irreparable harm has caused courts to replace what
should be a careful balancing test that takes into account the potential
for harm to both parties, along with the risk of judicial error, with a
single blunt question about the likelihood of success on the merits.
The presumption of irreparable injury shortcut ignores both
historical practice in copyright disputes and the Supreme Court's
repeated insistence that copyright infringement in transformative
cases does not necessarily cause copyright holders sufficient harm to
warrant an injunction. Transformative use cases often combine a
significant amount of original creative input by defendants with
particularly close and difficult questions of infringement. Courts
presuming irreparable harm are thus most likely to enjoin speech in
error precisely where a defendant's free expression interest is at its
peak.
144 See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Breathing Space, 30 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 429
(2oo7)(discussing First Amendment "breathing space" in defamation law as a model upon
which courts in copyright cases should draw).
'45 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 191 (2003) (characterizing fair use and the
idea/expression distinction as two safeguards for free speech and free expression interests
built into copyright law).
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